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I. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal of a ruling on a motion for summary judgment dismissal in a civil 
action. R. 152-54. Therefore, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 2002) (Supreme Court has jurisdiction over 
"orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals 
does not have original appellate jurisdiction"). 
II. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. The issue presented is whether the trial court erred in applying the savings 
statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40, despite Plaintiffs/Appellees' failure to timely satisfy 
the legislative mandates establishing compulsory conditions precedent to commencing 
litigation of malpractice actions against health care providers as set forth in Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-14-12 (Supp. 2002), thereby preventing Plaintiffs/Appellees from having 
commenced within due time their action prior to the running of the applicable statute of 
limitations and barring Plaintiffs/Appellees' medical malpractice action. R. 43-56; 87-97. 
The standard of review is one of correctness, giving no deference to the legal 
conclusions of the trial court. This Court has held, "In reviewing a grant of summary 
judgment, we give the court's legal decisions no deference, reviewing for correctness. 
Specifically, a district court's interpretation of a statutory provision is a question of law 
that we review for correctness." Davis County Waste Management v. City of Bountiful, 
2002 UT 60, 52 P.3d 1174 (citations omitted). 
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"In matters of pure statutory interpretation, an appellate court 
reviews a trial court's ruling for correctness and gives no 
deference to its legal conclusions." Moreover, when called 
upon to interpret a statute, "our primary goal is to give effect to 
the legislature's intent in light of the purpose the statute was 
meant to achieve." The best evidence of the true intent and 
purpose of the legislature in enacting a statute is the plain 
language of the statute. "We therefore look first to the statute's 
plain language." 
Lieber v. ITT Hartford Ins. Center, Inc., 2000 UT 90, \ 7, 15 P.3d 1030 (citations 
omitted). 
III. 
DETERMINATIVE OR IMPORTANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes and regulations are determinative 
or important to the resolution of this appeal. 
1. Utah Constitution, Article VIII, Section 5. [Jurisdiction of district court and 
other courts—Right of appeal.] 
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except 
as limited by this constitution or by statute, and power to issue all 
extraordinary writs. The district court shall have appellate jurisdiction 
as provided by statute. The jurisdiction of all other courts, both 
original and appellate, shall be provided by statute. Except for matters 
filed originally with the Supreme Court, there shall be in all cases an 
appeal of right from the court of original jurisdiction to a court with 
appellate jurisdiction over the cause. 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3 (Supp. 2002). Definitions. 
(8) "Division" means the Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing created in Section 58-1-103. 
(10) "Health care" means any act or treatment performed or furnished, 
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or which should have been performed or furnished, by any health care 
provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient during the patient's medical 
care, treatment, or confinement. 
(14) "Malpractice action against a health care provider" means any 
action against a health care provider, whether in contract, tort, breach 
of warranty, wrongful death, or otherwise, based upon alleged personal 
injuries relating to or arising out of health care rendered or which 
should have been rendered by the health care provider. 
(20) "Patient" means a person who is under the care of a health care 
provider, under a contract, express or implied. 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (1996). Statute of limitations-Exceptions-
Application. 
(1) No malpractice action against a health care provider may be 
brought unless it is commenced within two years after the plaintiff or 
patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should 
have discovered the injury, whichever first occurs . . . . 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-8 (1996). Notice of intent to commence action. 
No malpractice action against a health care provider may be initiated 
unless and until the plaintiff gives the prospective defendant or his 
executor or successor, at least ninety days' prior notice of intent to 
commence an action. Such notice shall include a general statement of 
the nature of the claim, the persons involved, the date, time and place 
of the occurrence, the circumstances thereof, specific allegations of 
misconduct on the part of the prospective defendant, the nature of the 
alleged injuries and other damages sustained. Notice may be in letter 
or affidavit form executed by the plaintiff or his attorney. Service 
shall be accomplished by persons authorized and in the manner 
prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for the service of the 
summons and complaint in a civil action or by certified mail, return 
receipt requested, in which case notice shall be deemed to have been 
served on the date of mailing. Such notice shall be served within the 
time allowed for commencing a malpractice action against a health 
care provider. If the notice is served less than ninety days prior to the 
expiration of the applicable time period, the time for commencing the 
malpractice action against the health care provider shall be extended 
3 
to 120 days from the date of service of notice. . . . 
5, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12 (Supp. 2002). Division to provide 
panel-Exemption- Procedures-Statute of limitations tolled-Composition of 
panel-Expenses-Division authorized to set license fees. 
(l)(a) The division shall provide a hearing panel in alleged medical 
liability cases against health care providers as defined in Section 
78-14-3, except dentists. 
(b)(i) The division shall establish procedures for prelitigation 
consideration of medical liability claims for damages arising 
out of the provision of or alleged failure to provide health care. 
(ii) The division may establish rules necessary to administer 
the process and procedures related to prelitigation hearings and 
the conduct of prelitigation hearings in accordance with 
Sections 78-14-12 through 78-14-16. 
(c) The proceedings are informal, nonbinding, and are not 
subject to Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures 
Act, but are compulsory as a condition precedent to 
commencing litigation. 
(d) Proceedings conducted under authority of this section are 
confidential, privileged, and immune from civil process. 
(2)(a) The party initiating a medical liability action shall file a request for 
prelitigation panel review with the division within 60 days after the service 
a statutory notice of intent to commence action under Section 78-14-8. 
(b) The request shall include a copy of the notice of intent to 
commence action. The request shall be mailed to all health 
care providers named in the notice and request. 
(3)(a) The filing of a request for prelitigation panel review under this 
section tolls the applicable statute of limitations until the earlier of 
60 days following the division's issuance of an opinion by the 
prelitigation panel, or 60 days following the termination of 
jurisdiction by the division as provided in this subsection. The 
division shall send any opinion issued by the panel to all parties by 
regular mail. 
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(b)(i) The division shall complete a prelitigation hearing under 
this section within 180 days after the filing of the request for 
prelitigation panel review, or within any longer period as 
agreed upon in writing by all parties to the review. 
(ii) If the prelitigation hearing has not been completed within 
the time limits established in Subsection (3)(b)(i), the division 
has no further jurisdiction over the matter subject to review 
and the claimant is considered to have complied with all 
conditions precedent required under this section prior to the 
commencement of litigation. 
(c)(i) The claimant and any respondent may agree by written 
stipulation that no useful purpose would be served by 
convening a prelitigation panel under this section. 
(ii) When the stipulation is filed with the division, the division 
shall within ten days after receipt enter an order divesting itself 
of jurisdiction over the claim, as it concerns the stipulating 
respondent, and stating that the claimant has complied with all 
conditions precedent to the commencement of litigation 
regarding the claim. . . . 
6. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1996). Effect of failure of action not on merits 
If any action is commenced within due time and a judgment thereon 
for the plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in such action or 
upon a cause of action otherwise than upon the merits, and the time 
limited either by law or contract for commencing the same shall have 
expired, the plaintiff, or if he dies and the cause of action survives, his 
representatives, may commence a new action within one year after the 
reversal or failure. 
IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This interlocutory appeal was brought to challenge the Ruling on Motion for 
Summary Judgement issued by the district court. The Defendants/Appellants IHC Health 
Services, Inc. dba Dixie Regional Medical Center (hereinafter "Dixie Regional Medical 
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Center") and G. Stedman Huard, M.D. (hereinafter "Dr. Huard") each moved to dismiss 
Plaintiffs/Appellees' (hereinafter "McBride-Williams") claims for failure to comply with 
the compulsory conditions precedent to commencing a malpractice claim mandated by the 
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (the "Act") as set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-1 
(1996) et seq. prior to the running of the statute of limitations barring their claims. R. 43-
72. 
Following briefing by the parties and oral argument, the trial court on August 30, 
2002 entered its ruling denying Dixie Regional Medical Center's and Dr. Huard's motions. 
R. 152-14. In denying their motions, the trial court concluded "that the 'savings' provisions 
of section 78-12-40 are applicable to Plaintiffs' action against Defendants." R. 154. the 
Dixie Regional Medical Center now appeals the trial court's legal conclusion on the ground 
that because McBride-Williams did not satisfy the statutory conditions precedent to 
commencing litigation, the mere filing of a complaint prior to satisfying the statutory 
conditions precedent could not and did not commence their medical malpractice action 
within due time. The express statutory language of the Act specifying that certain statutory 
procedures are "compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing litigation" 
indicates clear legislative intent to bar medical malpractice actions unless those conditions 
precedent are satisfied prior to the running of the statute of limitations. Therefore, 




STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts are relevant to the issues presented to this Court for review. 
1. McBride-Williams' medical malpractice action arises from the September 
11, 1998 admission of their father, Kaarman McBride, to Dixie Regional Medical Center 
where surgery was performed for an abdominal aortic aneurysm and where Mr. McBride 
received care prior to his death on October 15, 1998. R. 13. 
2. The injury which is the subject of this action, Mr. McBride's death, occurred 
and was certainly discovered by October 15, 1998. R. 44; 152. 
3. Dixie Regional Medical Center and Dr. Huard are each a "Health care 
provider" as defined by the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-
3(1 l)(Supp. 2002). R. 44-45. 
4. Under the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, a '"Malpractice action against a 
health care provider' means any action against a health care provider, whether in contract, 
tort, breach of warranty, wrongful death, or otherwise, based upon alleged personal injuries 
relating to or arising out of health care rendered or which should have been rendered by the 
health care provider." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(14) (Supp. 2002). R. 45. 
5. The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act also sets forth various conditions 
which are "compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing litigation." Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-14-12(l)(c) (Supp. 2002). R. 46. 
6. McBride-Williams previously filed an initial complaint on September 15, 
2000 (hereinafter "Initial Complaint"). R. 152. 
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7. Because the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act clearly mandates that no 
malpractice litigation against a health care provider may be commenced until the plaintiff 
satisfies conditions which "are compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing 
litigation," Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(l)(c), and because McBride-Williams had not met 
those statutory conditions precedent to commence litigation, Dixie Regional Medical 
Center and Dr. Huard moved to dismiss the Initial Complaint filed on September 15, 2001. 
R.44. 
8. On May 29, 2001, the trial court granted Dixie Regional Medical Center's 
and Dr. Huard's motions to dismiss the Initial Complaint because of McBride-Williams" 
"failure to comply with the pre-litigation requirements of the Utah Health Care Malpractice 
Act, §§ 78-14-let. seq." R. 51-53; 152-53. 
9. In the May 29, 2001 order, the trial court referred to documents submitted 
by McBride-Williams demonstrating that even before they had filed their initial complaint, 
McBride-Williams had "been warned about the need to follow required pre-litigation 
procedures." R. 52. Those documents included correspondence dated A.pril 6, 1999 from 
a Utah attorney advising McBride-Williams, "I have sent along the Utah Statutes pertaining 
to medical malpractice. In addition to the two-year statute of limitations, there are other 
requirements. It would be best if you retained an attorney." For example, to toll the statute 
of limitations for a medical malpractice action a plaintiff must file a notice of intent 
pursuant to Section 78-14-8 and properly initiate the prelitigation panel review pursuant to 
Section 78-14-12. Further, in correspondence dated May 19, 1999, McBride-Williams 
Appellee Teresa McBride admits, "I am aware the statute is 2 years in Utah." In addition, in 
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a letter dated July 1, 1999, McBride-Williams Appellee Teresa McBride was advised, "You 
should be aware that state and federal laws limit the time frame within which a legal action 
may be brought in this type of case. The period of time available for filing a legal action is 
determined through application of the relevant statute of limitations in your jurisdiction to 
the facts of the case. If you should have any questions on the statute of limitations issue, 
you should consult a legal professional without delay." The court found at that time that 
"Plaintiffs' decision to attempt the interstate, pro se litigation of a complicated and 
sophisticated legal matter is simply foolhardy." R. 51-53. 
10. Because the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act provides that medical 
malpractice actions must be "commenced within two years after the plaintiff or patient 
discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury, 
whichever first occurs," Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4, and because McBride-Williams had 
not complied with the statutory provisions which toll the statute of limitations, Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-14-12(3), the statute of limitations for McBride-Williams to commence their 
medical malpractice action had run no later than October 15, 2000, the date two years after 
the death of Kaarman McBride. R. 44. 
11. On May 9, 2001, after the statute of limitations had already run, 
McBride-Williams belatedly served a Notice of Intent and Request for Prelitigation 
Review with the Division of Occupational & Professional Licensing as required by Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 78-14-8 and 78-14-12. R. 44; 153. 
12. On December 12, 2001, a Certificate of Compliance was issued by the 
Division of Occupational & Professional Licensing. R. 44; 153. 
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13. McBride-Williams thereafter, on January 11, 2002, filed their second 
complaint (hereinafter "Second Complaint"). R. 13. 
14. Dixie Regional Medical Center filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on 
April 17, 2002, on the grounds that McBride-Williams' failure to timely comply with the 
legislative mandates which are "compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing 
litigation," Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(l)(c), resulted in McBride-Williams' action being 
barred by the applicable statute of limitations. R. 43-55. Dr. Huard joined in the motion on 
May 1,2002. R. 59-72 
15. McBride-Williams opposed the motions to dismiss, filing various 
memoranda in opposition. R. 73-75; 147-151. 
16. On June 20, 2002, oral argument was heard on the motions to dismiss. R. 
152. 
17. On August 30, 2002, the Honorable G. Rand Beacham entered a ruling 
denying Dixie Regional Medical Center's and Dr. Huard's motions based the court's 
conclusion that the savings statute applied to the dismissal of the Initial Complaint.. R. 
152-14. The trial court found that there were no genuine issues as to the following facts: 
Plaintiffs seek damages related to the death of their father, 
which occurred October 15, 1998 at IHC's hospital in St. 
George, Utah. Plaintiffs first filed a pro se Complaint on 
September 15, 2000, which was dismissed by this Court on 
May 29, 2001 for Plaintiffs' failure to comply with the 
prelitigation requirements of the Utah Healthcare Malpractice 
Act, Utah Code Ann. §§78-14-1 et seq. See McBride-
Williams et al. v. Huard, et al.. Civil No. 00501491, Fifth 




SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
McBride-Williams' medical malpractice action arises out of the care provided to 
Mr. McBride by Dr. Huard and Dixie Regional Medical Center at the Dixie Regional 
Medical Center on September 11 and 12, 1998 and prior to Mr. McBride's death on 
October 15, 1998. Because this is a medical malpractice action, it is governed by the Utah 
Health Care Malpractice Act (the "Act"), Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-1 et seq. In 1985, the 
legislature amended the Act to establish certain statutory requirements which are 
"compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing litigation" of a medical 
malpractice action. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(l)(c) (emphasis added). The express 
statutory language specifying that the statutory procedures are "compulsory as a condition 
precedent to commencing litigation" clearly demonstrates the intent that these 
requirements must be completed prior to commencement of a medical malpractice action 
and indicates clear legislative intent to bar medical malpractice actions unless those 
conditions precedent are satisfied prior to the running of the statute of limitations. 
Despite having "been warned about the need to follow required pre-litigation 
procedures", (R. 152,) McBride-Williams ignored such warnings and disregarded the 
requirements of the Act by filing their Initial Complaint on September 15, 2000 prior to 
satisfying the Act's requirements which are "compulsory as a condition precedent to 
commencing litigation " Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(l)(c). On May 29, 2001, 
McBride-Williams' Initial Complaint was dismissed for "failure to comply with the pre-
litigation requirements of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, §§ 78-14-let. seq." R. 
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152-53. 
Based on established principles of statutory interpretation, McBride-Williams' 
filing of their Initial Complaint could not and did not commence McBride-Williams' 
medical malpractice action within due time. By specific legislative mandate the 
commencing of a medical action requires more than the usual rule for commencing an 
action of filing a complaint or service of a summons as specified in Rule 3 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, McBride-Williams should not be allowed to knowingly 
disregard the requirements and time frame established by the Act through simply filing a 
complaint and resorting to the application of the savings statute. McBride-Williams' 
knowing failure to satisfy the Act's requirements which are "compulsory as condition 
precedent to commencing litigation," resulted in McBride-Williams failing to commence 
an action "within due time" as required for application of the savings statute, Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-40 (1996). Because the compulsory conditions precedent to commencing a 
medical malpractice action were not timely satisfied, no action was commenced in due 
time by McBride-Williams. Therefore, McBride-Williams' failure to satisfy the statutory 
conditions precedent to commencing their medical malpractice action is not cured by the 
application of the savings statute. 
Not only was the filing of their Initial Complaint ineffective to commence their 
medical malpractice action in due time, it was also ineffective to toll the statute of 
limitations because McBride-Williams had failed to comply with the statutory 
requirements necessary to toll the applicable statute of limitations, Utah Code Ann. § 78-
14-4; -12(3), and the statute of limitations ran on October 15, 2000 barring 
12 




PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION DEMONSTRATE THAT THE 
UTAH HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE ACT SPECIFIES THAT CERTAIN 
REQUIREMENTS MUST BE SATISFIED BEFORE A MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
ACTION CAN BE COMMENCED. 
The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (the "Act"), Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-1 et 
seq., clearly provides that no malpractice litigation against a health care provider may be 
commenced until the plaintiff satisfies conditions which "are compulsory as a condition 
precedent to commencing litigation." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(l)(c) (Supp. 2002) 
(emphasis added). The Act further specifies that a medical malpractice claimant must have 
"complied with all conditions precedent to the commencement of litigation regarding 
the claim" and must satisfy "all conditions precedent required under this section prior to 
the commencement of litigation." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(3)(b)(ii), -12(3)(c)(ii) 
(Supp. 2002) (emphasis added.) By the plain language of the Act, it is clear that the 
prelitigation panel review processes set forth in Section 78-14-12 are operative in the 
commencement of a medical malpractice action and determine when and how an action can 
be commenced.1 
]The Utah Constitution, Article VIII, Section 5 provides, in pertinent part, that "The 
district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as limited by this 
constitution or by statute." The Act specifically limits the jurisdiction of the district court 
by setting forth conditions precedent to the commencement of a malpractice action against 
a health care provider. 
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The issues before this Court are readily resolved in favor of Dixie Regional Medical 
Center through the proper statutory interpretation of the applicable statutes. As the Utah 
Supreme Court has held: 
When faced with a question of statutory construction, we look 
first to the plain language of the statute. In so doing, [w]e 
presume that the legislature used each word advisedly and give 
effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted 
meaning. We will not infer substantive terms into the text that 
are not already there. Rather, the interpretation must be based 
on the language used, and [we have] no power to rewrite the 
statute to conform to an intention not expressed. 
Arredondo v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., 2001 UT 29, U 12, 24 P.3d 928 (quotation 
marks and citations omitted, alterations in original). Thus, each word in the phrase 
"compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing litigation" is to be given effect.2 
Thus, the terms "compulsory," "condition precedent to commencing litigation," "required, 
"and "prior to the commencement" should be given effect. Therefor it is necessary to 
consider what the plain meaning of "condition precedent" is. Condition precedent is 
2In fact, inclusion in the act of language specifying requirements which are 
"compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing litigation" is unique among Utah 
statutes. No other Utah statutory provision specifies conditions precedent to "commencing 
litigation." For example, Section 63-30-11(2) of the Governmental Immunity Act deals 
only with the filing of a notice of claim, but lacks language addressing the commencing of 
an action. Nowhere in the Governmental Immunity Act is there a specific legislative 
mandate similar to that in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act specifying that compliance 
with the prelitigation requirements is "compulsory as a condition precedent to 
commencing litigation." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(l)(c) (Supp. 2002) (emphasis 
added). Moreover, nowhere in the Governmental Immunity Act does the legislature clearly 
indicate, as it does in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, that the claimant must "have 
complied with all conditions precedent required under this section prior to the 
commencement of litigation." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(3)(b)(ii) (Supp. 2002) 
(emphasis added). 
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defined as follows: "A condition precedent is one . . . which is to be performed before 
some right dependent thereon accrues, or some act dependent thereon is performed." 
Black's Law Dictionary, (6th Ed. 1991). 
In addition, the statutory scheme of the Act is interpreted as a comprehensive whole. 
The primary role of statutory interpretation is to give effect to 
the intent of the legislature in light of the purpose the statute 
was meant to achieve. The best indicator of that intent is the 
plain language of the statute. Also, [a] general rule of statutory 
construction is that a statute should be construed as a 
comprehensive whole. 
Beaver County v. Utah State Tax Coram 'n, 916 P.2d 344, 358 (Utah 1996) quotation 
marks and citations omitted, alterations in original). The statutory scheme set forth in the 
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act focuses on what is the proper statute of limitations 
period. It is uncontested that the applicable statute of limitations governing 
McBride-Williams' medical malpractice claims is set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4. 
The legislature crafted the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act to include provisions ensuring 
that the statute of limitations is tolled during a properly initiated prelitigation process, 
which is compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing litigation. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-14-12 (Supp. 2002). 
In section 78-14-12, the legislature made clear that panel 
review is to be a precondition to the commencement of a 
malpractice action: 'The proceedings are informal, nonbinding 
. . . but are compulsoiy as a condition precedent to 
commencing litigation." Id. § 78-14-12(l)(c) (emphasis 
added). In addition, to remove any doubt that panel review is to 
occur prior to any litigation, the legislature used the term 
"prelitigation" to describe the panel or its activities no less 
than ten times. Id. § 78-14-12(l)(b), (2)(a), (3), (5)(a), (7), 
(8)(b). Finally, the legislature unambiguously provided that 
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panel review would toll the applicable statute of limitations: 
"The filing of a request for prelitigation panel review under this 
section tolls the applicable statute of limitations until 60 days 
following the division's issuance of an opinion by the 
prelitigation panel." Id. § 78-14-12(3). Thus, a cursory 
examination of this section reveals that the legislature is quite 
adept at both mandating panel review of claims as a 
precondition to litigation and tolling applicable statutes of 
limitations. 
DOIT, Inc. v. Touche, Ross & Co., 926 P.2d 835, 852 (Utah 1996) (Russon, J., dissenting). 
The clear intent is that prior to commencing litigation of a medical malpractice 
claim, the prelitigation process must be timely initiated and the statute of limitations 
thereby tolled before the running of the original statute of limitations. In the medical 
malpractice context, a plaintiff cannot toll or extend the statute of limitations by simply 
filing a complaint in district court when the conditions precedent to commencing litigation 
have not been met. 
Such principles of statutory construction and interpretation are well established. 
In matters of statutory construction, "[t]he best evidence of the 
true intent and purpose of the Legislature in enacting [an] Act is 
the plain language of the Act." "[Statutory enactments are to be 
construed as to render all parts thereof relevant and 
meaningful." Likewise, we are compelled to give the statutory 
language meaning and to assume that "each term in the statute 
was used advisedly . . . unless such a reading is unreasonably 
confused or inoperable." We will avoid an interpretation which 
renders portions of, or words in, a statute superfluous or 
inoperative. 
Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 662 (Utah 1997) (citing State v. Hunt, 
906 P.2d 311,312 (Utah 1995); Savage Indus., Inc. v. State Tax Comm 'n,Sll P.2d 664, 
670 (Utah 1991); Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 
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1984); Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980)). Consequently, it 
should be assumed the legislature advisedly used each term when it provided that the 
prelitigation review is "compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing litigation." 
The plain language of the Act demonstrates that before a medical malpractice action 
can be commenced, certain statutory prerequisites must be satisfied. The specific 
language of Section 78-14-12 demonstrates a legislative mandate that the commencing of a 
medical action requires more than the usual rule for commencing an action. Because the 
requirements are "compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing litigation," it is not 
enough to commence a medical malpractice action to simply file a complaint or serve a 
summons as specified in Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Disregarding the 
plain language would render the words used in the Act superfluous or inoperative. The 
inclusion of this language in the statute indicates the legislature's intention to define how 
and when a medical malpractice action must be commenced. The use of the language 
"compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing litigation" demonstrates the intent 
that the prelitigation panel review process set forth in Section 78-14-12 is an operative fact 
in the commencement of an action and determinative of when an action can be 
commenced. 
It is also well established that "[t]he form of the verb used in a 
statute, i.e., something 'may,' 'shall' or 'must' be done, is the 
single most important textual consideration determining 
whether a statute is mandatory or directory." 
"According to its ordinary construction, the term 'may' means 
permissive, and it should receive that interpretation unless such 
a construction would be obviously repugnant to the intention of 
the Legislature or would lead to some other inconvenience or 
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absurdity." The term "shall," on the other hand, "is usually 
presumed mandatory and has been interpreted as such 
previously in this and other jurisdictions." 
State ex rel M.C., 940 P.2d 1229, 1236 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citations omitted). "The 
meaning of the word shall is ordinarily that of command." Herr v. Salt Lake County, 525 
P.2d 728, 729 (Utah 1974). The Act further specifies that "The party initiating a medical 
liability action shall file a request for prelitigation panel review." Utah Code Ann. § 78-
14-12(2)(a) (Supp. 2002) (emphasis added). Thus, the prelitigation panel review is 
mandatory. "This mandatory language leaves no discretion to the court." Lyon v. Burton, 
2000 UT 19, \ 76, 5 P.3d 616. No malpractice action can be commenced until the 
compulsory conditions precedent specified by the Act are satisfied. 
McBride-Williams' Initial Complaint was dismissed because they failed to meet the 
requirements to commence a malpractice action. Section 78-14-12(l)(c) clearly states 
that the prelitigation panel review proceedings are "compulsory as a condition precedent to 
commencing litigation." To satisfy the compulsory conditions precedent, generally a 
prelitigation panel review takes place and the Division issues an opinion by the prelitigation 
panel. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(3)(a) (Supp. 2002). It is undisputed that no such 
review occurred in this matter prior to the filing of the Initial Complaint. The Act further 
reinforces that before litigation may be commenced, the claimant must have "complied 
with all conditions precedent to the commencement of litigation regarding the claim." 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(3)(c)(ii) (Supp. 2002) (emphasis added). In fact, so clear is 
the legislative intent that the prelitigation review process is compulsory as a condition 
precedent to commencing litigation, the Act sets forth two alternative means to satisfying 
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"all conditions precedent required under this section prior to the commencement of 
litigation." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(3)(b)(ii) (Supp. 2002) (emphasis added.) In this 
case, neither alternative was satisfied at the time McBride-Williams filed their Initial 
Complaint. Again, the plain statutory language reinforces the legislative intent that a 
petitioner must have complied with all conditions precedent in order to even commence 
any litigation regarding the claim. 
One alternative to completing a prelitigation panel review is that "the claimant and 
any respondent may agree by written stipulation" to waive the prelitigation requirements. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(3)(c)(i) (Supp. 2002). If such a "stipulation is filed with the 
division, the division shall within ten days after receipt enter an order divesting itself of 
jurisdiction over the claim, as it concerns the stipulating respondent, and stating that the 
claimant has complied with all conditions precedent to the commencement of litigation 
regarding the claim." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(3)(c)(ii) (Supp. 2002). No such 
stipulation or order exists in this case. 
The second alternative to prelitigation is set forth in Section 78-14-12(3)(b). That 
section of the Act provides: 
(b)(i) The division shall complete a prelitigation hearing under 
this section within 180 days after the filing of the request for 
prelitigation panel review, or within any longer period as 
agreed upon in writing by all parties to the review. 
(ii) If the prelitigation hearing has not been completed within 
the time limits established in Subsection (3)(b)(i), the division 
has no further jurisdiction over the matter subject to review 
and the claimant is considered to have complied with all 
conditions precedent required under this section prior to the 
commencement of litigation. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(3)(b) (Supp. 2002). Once again, the legislature used the plain 
language that all conditions precedent required under this section must be complied with 
prior to the commencement of litigation. 
Indeed, an examination of the plain language of the Act of the statutory scheme 
construed as a whole demonstrates that by failing to comply with statutory conditions 
precedent to commence their medical malpractice action, McBride-Williams failed to 
commence their action within due time and failed to toll the applicable statute of 
limitations by simply filing their Initial Complaint on September 15, 2000. 
POINT II. 
THE SAVINGS STATUTE IS INAPPLICABLE BECAUSE MCBFtfDE-WILLIAMS' 
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH STATUTORY CONDITIONS PRECEDENT 
PREVENTED THE COMMENCEMENT OF THEIR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
ACTION. 
Because McBride-Williams had not satisfied the requirements which are 
"compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing litigation," they could not and did not 
effectively commence their medical malpractice litigation by filing their Initial Complaint. 
In the medical malpractice context, a plaintiff cannot commence a medical malpractice 
action by simply filing a complaint in district court when the conditions precedent to 
commencing litigation have not been met. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12 (Supp. 2002). 
The Utah savings statute provides: 
If any action is commenced within due time and a judgment 
thereon for the plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in such 
action or upon a cause of action otherwise than upon the merits, and 
the time limited either by law or contract for commencing the same 
shall have expired, the plaintiff, or if he dies and the cause of action 
survives, his representatives, may commence a new action within one 
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year after the reversal or failure. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1996) (emphasis added). Thus, in order for the savings statute 
to apply, an action must first be commenced within due time. Because McBride-Williams 
never commenced their malpractice action by filing their Initial Complaint prior to the 
running of the two-year statute of limitations, the savings statute is inapplicable. 
The Kansas Supreme Court, interpreting similar statutory language, found clear 
legislative intent preventing the commencement of litigation absent the completion of 
conditions precedent prior to filing of a complaint. In Gessner v. Phillips County 
Commissioners, 11 P.3d 1131 (Kan. 2000), the plaintiffs filed suit against the county for 
injuries sustained in an automobile accident involving an ambulance which belonged to the 
county. As in the case at hand, in Gessner the initial "actions were dismissed by the trial 
court for lack of jurisdiction" because of the failure to comply with statutory conditions 
precedent "prior to filing the suits." Id. at 1132. 
Similar to McBride-Williams' belated filing of the notice of intent to commence 
litigation and request for prelitigation required by the Act, in Gessner after dismissal of the 
initial actions, the plaintiffs mailed notices to the county in a belated effort to comply with 
the statutory conditions precedent and filed new actions. The plaintiffs then "contended] 
their actions [we]re timely because the savings statute provisions . . . operate to extend the 
time in which the requisite notice [condition precedent] is required to be given." Id. The 
arguments, which the court rejected, were similar to those made by McBride-Williams in 
the present action: 
The principle [sic] argument in support of appellants' 
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contention that the savings statute should apply in this case is 
that their first suits were not dismissed on the merits and, 
therefore, the savings statute applies and brings life into their 
later filed actions. 
Id. at 1132-33. In rejecting the plaintiffs' argument, the court noted that "the question 
pivotal is whether the first actions were commenced in due time" and that the savings 
statute, which has language very similar to Utah's savings statute, "by its own terms cannot 
operate to save or revive a dismissed cause of action unless the original dismissed action 
was first 'commenced within due time.5" Id. at 1133. 
The Gessner court, examining the relevant statutory provisions including the 
specific language "before commencing such action" and "no action shall be commenced 
until," held that such language "expresses a clear legislative intent to disallow the 
commencement of any actions prior to the filing of the requisite notice." Id. at 1133-34 
(emphasis added). The court further referred to the statutory prerequisite as "a 
jurisdictional prerequisite to commencing a lawsuit" and as a "condition precedent to the 
filing of an action." Id. at 1134. Consequently, the court held: 
It is clear that the legislature intended that failure to provide 
the appropriate notice must be construed to preclude 
claimants from commencing a legal action. The failure to 
file a claim against a municipality, pursuant to [the 
statutory condition precedent], is not cured by the 
application of the savings statute . . . . 
We can reach no other conclusion but that the plaintiffs' 
actions were not commenced until well beyond the applicable 2 
year period of limitations and the trial court correctly entered 
orders of dismissal of all three cases. 
Id. (emphasis added). As was the case in Gessner, McBride-Williams' failure to timely 
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comply with statutory conditions precedent prevented the commencing of litigation and 
renders the savings statute inapplicable.3 
In addition, McBride-Williams' disregard for the statutory requirements of the Act 
was knowing. Despite McBride-Williams having "been warned about the need to follow 
required pre-litigation procedures/' (R. 152), McBride-Williams ignored such warnings 
and disregarded the requirements of the Act by filing their Initial Complaint on September 
15, 2000 prior to satisfying the Act's requirements which are "compulsory as a condition 
precedent to commencing litigation." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(l)(c) (Supp. 2002). 
McBride-Williams' knowing failure to satisfy the conditions is not cured by the application 
of the savings statute. Excusing McBride-Williams' disregard of the statutory provisions 
would defeat the very essence of the object sought to be accomplished by the legislature: 
that certain conditions are compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing litigation 
and that those conditions are to be completed within the applicable statute of limitations 
period. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(l)(c); -12(3)(b)(ii), -12(3)(c)(ii) (Supp. 2002). 
3Prior to the 1985 amendments to the Act, the application of the savings statute was 
permitted when a medical malpractice claimant's action was dismissed for filing the 
complaint prior to serving the notice of intent to commence litigation set forth in Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-14-8. See e.g. Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979); McGuire v. 
University of Utah Medical Center, 603 P.2d 786 (Utah 1979); Yates v. Vernal Family 
Health Center, 617 P.2d 352 (Utah 1980). However, the 1985 legislation makes it clear 
that the prelitigation panel review process added in § 78-14-12 are operative in the 
commencement of a medical malpractice action and determine when a medical malpractice 
action can be commenced. The addition of legislatively mandated compulsory conditions 
precedent to commencing litigation of a medical malpractice set forth in Utah Code Ann. 
§78-14-12 has superceded prior cases which allowed application of the savings statute on 
the basis that failing to provide a notice of intent as set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-8 
was not operative in the commencing of an action. 
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McBride-Williams should not be allowed to knowingly disregard the requirements and time 
frame established by the Act through the application of the savings statute. 
POINT III. 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WAS NOT TOLLED AND RAN PRIOR TO 
MCBRIDE-WILLIAMS FILING THEIR SECOND COMPLAINT. 
The statutory scheme set forth in the Act focuses on what is the proper statute of 
limitations period. It is uncontested that the applicable statute of limitaLtions governing 
McBride-Williams' medical malpractice claims is set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 
(1996). The legislature crafted the Act to include provisions ensuring that the statute of 
limitations is tolled during the prelitigation process, which is compulsory as a condition 
precedent to commencing litigation. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12 (Supp. 2002). The clear 
intent is that prior to commencing litigation of a medical malpractice claim, the 
prelitigation process must be properly initiated and the statute of limitations thereby tolled 
before the running of the original statute of limitations. The express statutory language 
specifying that certain statutory procedures are "compulsory as a condition precedent to 
commencing litigation" indicates clear legislative intent to bar medical malpractice actions 
unless those conditions precedent are satisfied prior to the running of the statute of 
limitations. Since the addition of Section 78-14-12 to the Act in 1985, a plaintiff cannot 
toll or extend the statute of limitations for a medical malpractice action by simply filing a 
complaint in district court when the conditions precedent to commencing litigation have 
not been met. 
To toll the statute of limitations for a medical malpractice action a plaintiff must 
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file a notice of intent pursuant to Section 78-14-8 and properly initiate the prelitigation 
panel review pursuant to Section 78-14-12. Because McBride-Williams did not comply 
with the statutory prerequisites, "the running of the statute of limitations was not tolled." 
Malone v. Parker, 826 P.2d 132, 136 (Utah 1992). 
In Kittredge v. Shaddy, 2001 UT, 20 P.3d 285, the plaintiffs medical malpractice 
action was dismissed because the statute of limitations had run despite plaintiffs attempts 
to comply with the conditions precedent of the Act. This Court noted that the Act requires 
compliance with certain conditions in order to extend and toll the running of the statute of 
limitations. The Court held that "Because the request [required by Section 78-14-12] was 
not timely filed, the statute of limitations was not tolled beyond the 120 day extension." 
Id. at If 7. Just as the statute of limitations ran in Kittredge because of the plaintiffs' failure 
to comply with the statutory requirements, the statute of limitations ran against 
McBride-Williams by October 20, 2000 because they had not satisfied the statutory 
conditions to extend or toll the statute of limitations beyond that date. A plaintiffs belated 
filing of a notice of intent and request for prelitigation "avails plaintiff nothing because the 
two-year statute of limitations ran long before." Id. at ^  6. It is inconsistent with Kittredge 
and Malone to assume that the mere filing of a complaint without having satisfied 
conditions precedent in a medical malpractice action tolls the statute of limitations, 
especially when in those cases the plaintiffs did not blatantly disregard the provisions of the 
Act. Indeed, cases clearly support the conclusion that a medical malpractice claimant has 




For the reasons set forth above, IHC Health Services, Inc. dba Dixie Regional 
Medical Center respectfully requests that the Court reverse the ruling of the trial court and 
find that the statute of limitations has run barring McBride-Williams' claims against IHC 
Health Services, Inc. dba Dixie Regional Medical Center. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /3 . day of January 2003. 
BURBIDGE & WHITE 
Jrinton R. Burbidge 
Paul D. Van Komen 
Attorneys for IHC Health Services, Inc. dba Dixie 
Regional Medical Center 
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JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT Art. VIE, § 5 
Sec. 5. [Jurisdiction of district court and other courts — 
Right of appeal.] 
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as 
limited by this constitution or by statute, and power to issue all extraordinary 
writs. The district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by stat-
ute. The jurisdiction of all other courts, both original and appellate, shall be 
provided by statute. Except for matters filed originally with the Supreme 
Court, there shall be in all cases an appeal of right from the court of original 
jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction over the cause. 
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of state 
law certified by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary 
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect 
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior to 
final judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originat-
ing with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; 
(v) the state engineer; or 
Ivi) the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources 
reviewing actions of the Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands; 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal 
adjudicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (3)(e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of 
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the 
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from an}7 court of record involving a charge of 
a first degree or capital felon}'; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction or charge of a 
first degree felony or capital felony; 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction; and 
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, or decrees 
ruling on legislative subpoenas. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the 
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate juris diction, 
except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a 
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) matters mvolving legislative subpoenas; and 
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition 
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the 
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals 
under Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
78-12-40. Effect of failure of action not on merits. 
If any action is commenced within due time and a judgment thereon for the 
plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in such action or upon a cause of 
action otherwise than upon the merits, and the time limited either by law or 
contract for commencing the same shall have expired, the plaintiff, or if he dies 
and the cause of action survives, his representatives, may commence a new 
action within one year after the reversal or failure. 
78-14-1. Short title of act. 
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act." 
78-14-3. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(I) "Audiologist" means a person licensed to practice audiology under 
Title 58, Chapter 41. Speech-language Pathology7 and Audiology Licensing 
Act. 
(2) "Certified social worker" means a person licensed to practice as a 
certified social worker under Section 58-60-305. 
(3.) "Chiropractic physician" means a person licensed to practice chiro-
practic under Title 58, Chapter 73, Chiropractic Physician Practice Act. 
(4) "Clinical social worker" means a person licensed to practice as a 
clinical social worker under Section 58-60-305. 
(5) "Commissioner" means the commissioner of insurance as provided 
in Section 31A-2-102. 
(6) "Dental hygienist" means a person licensed to practice dental 
hygiene as defined in Section 58-69-102. 
(7) "Dentist" means a person licensed to practice dentistry as defined in 
Section 58-69-102. 
(8) "Division" means the Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing created in Section 58-1-103. 
(9) "Future damages" includes damages for future medical treatment, 
care or custody, loss of future earnings, loss of bodily function, or future 
pain and suffering of the judgment creditor. 
(10) "Health care" means any act or treatment performed or furnished, 
or which should have been performed or furnished, b}T any health care 
provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient during the patient's medical care, 
treatment, or confinement. 
(II) "Health care facilhy" means general acute hospitals, specialty 
hospitals, home health agencies, hospices, nursing care facilities, assisted 
living facilities, birthing centers, ambulatory surgical facilities, small 
health care facilities, health care facilities owned or operated by health 
maintenance organizations, and end stage renal disease facilities. 
(12) "Health care provider" includes any person, partnership, associa-
tion, corporation, or other facility or institution who causes to be rendered 
or who renders health care or professional services as a hospital, health 
care facility, physician, registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, nurse-
midwife, dentist, dental 'hygienist, optometrist, clinical laboratory tech-
nologist, pharmacist, physical therapist, podiatric physician, psychologist, 
chiropractic physician, naturopathic physician, osteopathic physician, 
osteopathic physician and surgeon, audiologist, speech-language patholo-
gist, clinical social worker, certified social worker, social sendee worker, 
marriage and family counselor, practitioner of obstetrics, or others ren-
dering similar care and services relating to or arising out of the health 
needs of persons or groups of persons and officers, employees, or agents of 
any of the above acting in. the course and scope of their employment. 
(13) "Hospital" means a public or private institution licensed under 
Title 26, Chapter 21, Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act. 
(14) "Licensed practical nurse" means a person licensed to practice as a 
licensed practical nurse as provided in Section 58-31b-301. 
(15) "Malpractice action against a health care provider" means any 
action against a health care provider, whether in contract, tort, breach of 
warranty, wrongful death, or otherwise, based upon alleged personal 
injuries relating to or arising out of health care rendered or which should 
have been rendered by the health care provider. 
(16) "Marriage and family therapist" means a person licensed to prac-
tice as a marriage therapist or family therapist under Section 58-60-405 
and Section 58-60-305. 
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(17) "Naturopathic physician" means a person licensed to practice 
naturopathy as defined in Section 58-71-102. 
(18) "Nurse-midwife" means a person licensed to engage in practice as 
a nurse midwife under Section 58-44a-301. 
(19) "Optometrist" means a person licensed to practice optometry under 
Title 58, Chapter 16a, Utah Optometry Practice Act. 
(20) "Osteopathic physician" means a person licensed to practice oste-
opathy under Title 58, Chapter 68, Utah Osteopathic Medical Practice Act. 
(21) "Patient" means a person who is under the care of a health care 
provider, under a contract, express or implied. 
(22) "Pharmacist" means a person licensed to practice pharmacy as 
provided in Section 58-17a-301. 
(23) "Physical therapist" means a person licensed to practice physical 
therapy under Title 58, Chapter 24a, Physical Therapist Practice Act. 
(24) "Physician" means a person licensed to practice medicine and 
surgery under Title 58, Chapter 67, Utah Medical Practice Act. 
(25) "Podiatric physician" means a person licensed to practice podiatry 
under Title 58, Chapter 5a, Podiatric Physician Licensing Act. 
(26) "Practitioner of obstetrics" means a person licensed to practice as a 
physician in this state under Title 58, Chapter 67, Utah Medical Practice 
Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 68, Utah Osteopathic Medical Practice Act. 
(27) "Psychologist" means a person licensed under Title 58, Chapter 61, 
Psychologist Licensing Act, to practice psychology as defined in Section 
58-61-102. 
(28) "Registered nurse" means a person licensed to practice professional 
nursing as provided in Section 58-31b-301. 
(29) "Representative" means the spouse, parent, guardian, trustee, 
attorney-in-fact, or other legal agent of the patient. 
(30) "Social service worker" means a person licensed to practice as a 
social service worker under Section 58-60-205. 
(31) "Speech-language pathologist" means a person licensed to practice 
speech-language pathology under Title 58, Chapter 41, Speech-language 
Pathology and Audiology Licensing Act. 
(32) "Tort" means any legal wrong, breach of duty, or negligent or 
unlawful act or omission proximately causing injury or damage to another. 
78-14-4. Statute of limitations — Exceptions — Applica-
tion. 
(1) No malpractice action against a health care provider may be brought 
unless it is commenced within two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, 
or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury, 
whichever first occurs, but not to exceed four years after the date of the alleged 
act, omission, neglect or occurrence, except that: 
(a) In an action where the allegation against the health care provider is 
that a foreign object has been wrongfully left within a patient's body, the 
claim shall be barred unless commenced within one year after the plaintiff 
or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should 
have discovered, the existence of the foreign object wrongfully left in the 
patient's body, whichever first occurs; and 
(b) In an action where it is alleged that a patient has been prevented 
from discovering misconduct on the part of a health care provider because 
that health care provider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal 
the alleged misconduct, the claim shall be barred unless commenced 
within one year after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use 
of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the fraudulent conceal-
ment, whichever first occurs. 
(2) The provisions of this section shall apply to all persons, regardless of 
minority or other legal disability under Section 78-12-36 or any other provision 
of the law, and shall apply retroactively to all persons, partnerships, associa-
tions and corporations and to all health care providers and to all malpractice 
actions against health care providers based upon alleged personal injuries 
which occurred prior to the effective date of this act; provided, however, that 
any action which under former law could have been commenced after the 
effective date of this act may be commenced only within the unelapsed portion 
of time allowed under former law; but any action which under former law could 
have been commenced more than four years after the effective date of this act 
may be commenced only within four years after the effective date of this act. 
78-14-8. Notice of intent to commence action. 
No malpractice action against a health care provider may be initiated unless 
and until the plaintiff gives the prospective defendant or his executor or 
successor, at least ninety days' prior notice of intent to commence an action. 
Such notice shall include a general statement of the nature of the claim, the 
persons involved, the date, time and place of the occurrence, the circumstances 
thereof, specific allegations of misconduct on the part of the prospective 
defendant, the nature of the alleged injuries and other damages sustained. 
Notice may be in letter or affidavit form executed by the plaintiff or his 
attorney. Service shall be accomplished by persons authorized and in the 
manner prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for the service of the 
summons and complaint in a civil action or by certified mail, return receipt 
requested, in which case notice shall be deemed to have been served on the 
date of mailing. Such notice shall be served within the time allowed for 
commencing a malpractice action against a health care provider. If the notice 
is served less than ninety days prior to the expiration of the applicable time 
period, the time for commencing the malpractice action against the health care 
provider shall be extended to 120 days from the date of service of notice. 
This section shall, for purposes of determining its retroactivity, not be 
construed as relating to the limitation on the time for commencing any action, 
and shall apply only to causes of action arising on or after April 1, 1976. This 
section shall not apply to third party actions, counterclaims or crossclaims 
against a health care provider. 
78-14-12. Division to provide panel — Exemption — Pro-
cedures — Statute of limitations tolled — Com-
position of panel — Expenses — Division autho-
rized to set license fees. 
(1) (a) The division shall provide a hearing panel in alleged medical liability 
cases against health care providers as defined in Section 78-14-3, except 
dentists. 
(b) (i) The division shall establish procedures for prelitigation consid-
eration of medical liability claims for damages arising out of the 
provision of or alleged failure-to-provide health care, 
(ii) The division may establish rules necessary to administer the 
process and procedures related to prelitigation hearings and the 
conduct of prelitigation hearings in accordance with Sections 78-14-12 
through 78-14-16. 
(c) The proceedings are informal, nonbinding, and are not subject to 
Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, but are compulsory 
as a condition precedent to commencing litigation. 
(d) Proceedings conducted under authority of this section are confiden-
tial, privileged, and immune from civil process. 
(2) (a) The party initiating a medical Hability action shall file a request for 
prelitigation panel review with the division within 60 days after the 
sendee of a statutory notice of intent to commence action under Section 
78-14-8. 
(b) The request shall include a cop}^  of the notice of intent to commence 
action. The request shall be mailed to all health care providers named in 
the notice and request. 
(3) (a) The filing of a request for prelitigation panel review under this 
section tolls the applicable statute of limitations until the earlier of 60 
days following the division's issuance of an opinion by the prelitigation 
panel, or 60 days following the termination of jurisdiction by the division 
as provided in this subsection. The division shall send any opinion issued 
by the panel to all parties by regular mail. 
(b) (i) The division shall complete a prelitigation hearing under this 
section within 180 days after the filing of the request for prelitigation 
panel review, or within any longer period as agreed upon in writing by 
all parties to the review. 
(ii) If the prelitigation hearing has not been completed within the 
time limits established in Subsection (3)(b)(i), the division has no 
further jurisdiction over the matter subject to review and the claimant 
is considered to have complied with all conditions precedent required 
under this section prior to the commencement of litigation. 
(c) (i) The claimant and any respondent may agree by written stipula-
tion that no useful purpose would be served by convening a 
prelitigation panel under this section. 
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(ii) When the stipulation is filed with the division, the division shall 
within ten days after receipt enter an order divesting itself of 
jurisdiction over the claim, as it concerns the stipulating respondent, 
and stating that the claimant has complied with all conditions 
precedent to the commencement of litigation regarding the claim. 
(4) The division shall provide for and appoint an appropriate panel or panels 
to hear complaints of medical liability and damages, made by or on behalf of 
any patient who is an alleged victim of medical hability. The panels are 
composed of: 
(a) one member who is a resident lawyer currently licensed and in good 
standing to practice law in this state and who shall serve as chairman of 
the panel, who is appointed by the division from among qualified individu-
als who have registered with the division indicating a willingness to serve 
as panel members, and a willingness to comply with the ru].es of profes-
sional conduct governing lawyers in the state of Utah? and who has 
completed division training regarding conduct of panel hearings; 
(b) (i) one member who is a licensed health care provider listed under 
Section 78-14-3, who is practicing and knowledgeable in the same 
specialty as the proposed defendant, and who is appointed by the 
division in accordance with Subsection (5); or 
(ii) in claims against only hospitals or their employees, one member 
who is an individual currently serving in a hospital administration 
position directly related to hospital operations or conduct that in-
cludes responsibility for the area of practice that is the subject of the 
liability claim, and who is appointed by the division; and 
(c) a lay panelist who is not a lawyer, doctor, hospital employee, or other 
health care provider, and who is a responsible citizen of the state, selected 
and appointed by the division from among individuals who have completed 
division training with respect to panel hearings. 
(5) (a) Each person listed as a health care provider in Section 78-14-3 and 
practicing under a license issued by the state, is obligated as a condition 
of holding that license to participate as a member of a medical liability 
prelitigation panel at reasonable times, places, and intervals, upon issu-
ance, with advance notice given in a reasonable time frame, by the division 
of an Order to Participate as a Medical Liability Prelitigation Panel 
Member. 
(b) A licensee may be excused from appearance and participation as a 
panel member upon the division finding participation by the licensee will 
create an unreasonable burden or hardship upon the licensee. 
(c) A licensee whom the division finds failed to appear and participate 
as a panel member when so ordered, without adequate explanation or 
justification and without being excused for cause by the division, may be 
assessed an administrative fine not to exceed $5,000. 
(d) A licensee whom the division finds intentionally or repeatedly failed 
to appear and participate as a panel member when so ordered, without 
adequate explanation or justification and without being excused for cause 
by the division, may be assessed an administrative fine not to exceed 
$5,000, and is guilty of unprofessional conduct. 
(e) All fines collected under Subsections (5)(c) and (d) shall be deposited 
in the Physicians Education Fund created in Section 58-67a-l. 
(6) Each person selected as a panel member shall certify, under oath, that he 
has no bias or conflict of interest with respect to any matter under consider-
ation. 
(7) Members of the prelitigation hearing panels shall receive per diem 
compensation and travel expenses for attending panel hearings as established 
by rules of the division. 
(8) (a) In addition to the actual cost of administering the licensure of health 
care providers, the division may set license fees of health care providers 
within the limits established by law equal to their proportionate costs of 
administering prelitigation panels. 
(b) The claimant bears none of the costs of administering the 
prelitigation panel except under Section 78-14-16. 
IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TERESA MCBRIDE-WILLIAMS, et al.J 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
G. STEDMAN HUARD, et al., ; 
Defendants. ' 
) RULING ON MOTION FOR 
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
) Civil No. 020500090 
) Judge G. Rand Beacham 
This matter came before the Court for hearing on June 20, 2002 pursuant to the 
Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant IHC Health Services, Inc. dba Dixie Regional 
Medical Center. The motion was joined by Defendant G. Stedman Huard and was opposed 
by Plaintiffs. The Court granted permission to file additional authorities after the hearing, 
and the last were filed July 23, 2002. Having read the memoranda and authorities, having 
heard the arguments of counsel, and having reviewed the file, the Court rules as follows: 
FACTS 
There are no genuine issues as to the following essential facts: Plaintiffs seek damages 
related to the death of their father, which occurred October 15,1998 at IHC's hospital in St. 
George, Utah. Plaintiffs first filed a pro se Complaint on September 15, 2000, which was 
dismissed by this Court on May 29, 2001 for Plaintiffs' failure to comply with the pre-
litigation requirements of the Utah Healthcare Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann. § § 78-14-1 
et seq. See McBride-Williams. et al. v. Huard, et aL Civil No. 000501491, Fifth District 
Court for Washington County, State of Utah. On May 9,2001 Just prior to the dismissal of 
the first action, Plaintiffs served a Notice of Intent and Request for Prelitigation Review with 
the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing. On December 12, 2001, a 
Certificate of Compliance was issued by the Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing. Plaintiffs then filed the Complaint in this action on January 11, 2002.1 
ANALYSIS 
Defendants rely on Utah. Code Ann. § 78-14-12, which provides that the proceedings 
for pre-litigation reviews of malpractice actions against health care providers "are 
compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing litigation/5 Defendants also rely on 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4, which provides that "[n]o malpractice action against a health care 
provider may be brought unless it is commenced within two years after the plaintiff or patient 
discovers . . . the injury. . ." On this basis, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' Complaint in 
this action, which was filed more than two years after the death of Plaintiffs' father, was 
commenced more than one year too late. 
Plaintiffs rely on Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40, which provides that "[i]f any action is 
llt has been the experience of this Court and others at the trial court level that the facts on which we rely 
are occasionally changed at the appellate court level, even to include facts which were not presented to the trial 
court at all. This appears to result occasionally from appeUate attorneys failing to give the appellate courts a 
complete record of the facts as they were presented to the trial court. On a motion for summary judgment, this 
Court feels constrained to consider only those facts which are presented in compliance with Rule 4-501 of the Utah 
Rules of Judicial Administration, and it is this Court's opinion that an appellate review which extends beyond 
those facts, as identified by the trial court, is erroneous. Consequently, this Court emphasizes that this Ruling is 
based on the set of facts specified above. 
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commenced within due time and . . . if the plaintiff fails in such action or upon a cause of 
action otherwise than upon the merits, and the time limited . . . by law . . . for commencing 
the same shall have expired, the plaintiff. . . may commence a new action within one year 
after the... failure." On this basis, Plaintiffs argue that the dismissal of their first Complaint 
was "otherwise than upon the merits," and that their Complaint in this action was filed within 
one year after the dismissal of the first Complaint and after complying with the pre-litigation 
requirements, so that their causes of action are saved by section 78-12-40 and are not barred 
by the statute of limitations of section 78-14-4. 
Neither party has cited controlling authority on this issue, because apparently none 
exists in Utah. Defendants cite one persuasive decision from a sister state, but this Court is 
mostpersuaded by Plaintiffs' argument from Standard Federal Savings and Loan Association 
v. Kirkbride, 821 P.2d 1136 (Utah 1991). In that decision, the court held that the statute 
requiring an action for a deficiency judgment to be filed within three months after a trust 
deed foreclosure sale didnotrule out application of the "savings" provision of section 78-12-
40. The court's reasoning focused on legislative intent: 
In the absence of such a plain expression of intent [to forever bar an action 
from being refilled after a dismissal for a procedural defect], we have generally 
read statutes that impose preconditions to filing suit as establishing only 
procedural hurdles to suit, hurdles that can be cleared, rather than absolute 
bars to suit. . . . The relevant inquiry is whether the legislature made plain an 
intention to bar forever claims of those who are guilty of a procedural misstep. 
821 P.2d at 
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This Court agrees with Plaintiffs that section 78-14-12 does not plainly state an 
intention to bar forever malpractice claims against health care providers which have been 
dismissed for failure to comply with pre-litigation requirements, even when read in 
connection with section 78-14-4. This Court is persuaded that the "savings" provisions of 
section 78-12-40 are applicable to Plaintiffs' action against Defendants.2 
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. This Ruling is 
not a final order for appeal, of course. The Court suggests, however, that Defendants 
consider filing a petition for permission to appeal from an interlocutory order. 
Dated this day of August, 2002. 
G. RAND BEACHAM, JUDGE 
2This Court is fully aware of the now-frequent instruction of the appellate courts for the trial courts to 
make a more extensive analysis m rulings such as this See, e g, Gabriel v Salt Lake City Corp., 2001 UT App 
277, 431 Utah Adv Rep 7 That instruction is not always realistic, however First, the caseloads of the trial 
courts continue to increase while many courts' time and resources remain stagnant, for example, the judicial 
resources m this district have remained the same for over 13 years m spite of the overwhelming growth in the 
population and case filings m the district Second, appellate reviews of summary judgment decisions of the Utah 
district courts resulted m a reversal rate well over 50% m reported cases decided in the Utah appellate courts m the 
year 2000 In light of the huge caseloads earned by the tnal courts, the time required for drafting detailed ruling 
(winch is more likely to be reversed than to be affirmed) is often too great a luxury for a tnal judge to afford 
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